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POSTSCRIPTS

Religious Neutrality
In the rash of comment which followed
the Supreme Court's decision in School
Dist. of A bington Township v. Schempp,1
banning the reading and recitation of the
Lord's Prayer, on June 17, 1963, another
case, Sherbert v. Verner,2 decided that day
has been largely ignored. Since the two decisions were apparently written at the same
time and are thus "part of the same transaction," the implications of the latter decision
throw an important light on the developing
concept of religious neutrality.
The appellant, a member of the SeventhDay Adventist Church, had been discharged by her South Carolina employer
because she would not work on Saturday,
the Sabbath of her faith. Unable to obtain
employment because she would not work on
Saturday, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South
Carolina Unemployment Compensation
Act. That law provides that a claimant is
ineligible for benefits if he has failed, without good cause, to accept available suitable
work when it is offered to him. On this
ground the state commission denied her
application.
The Supreme Court, speaking through
'374 U.S. 203 (1963).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).

Mr. Justice Brennan, reversed the judgment
of the South Carolina Supreme Court and
held that the state commission's action was
an unconstitutional infringement of appellant's rights under the free exercise clause
of the first amendment, made applicable to
the states by the fourteenth amendment.
Mr. Justice Brennan declared that the
disqualification for benefits burdened, at
least indirectly, the free exercise of her religion. Not only did her ineligibility derive
solely from the practice of her religion, but
the ruling forced her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, or abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept
work. Government could not place a citizen
in this dilemma. The same result was dictated by decisions in the larger context of
other first amendment freedoms, which held
that the bestowal of public benefits cannot
be used to inhibit or deter the exercise of
these freedoms.
The Court also found no compelling state
interest of sufficient magnitude to justify the
burden placed on her free exercise right.
The only one suggested had been the possibility that the filing of fraudulent claims by
unscrupulous claimants feigning religious
objections to Saturday work might not only
hi. at .407.
h
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dilute the unemployment compensation
fund but also hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work. Even if
this objection had been argued in the lower
courts (which it had not), the Court doubted
whether evidence supporting this contention
would be sufficient to warrant a substantial
4
infringement of religious liberties.
The Court ruled out possible objections
that its decision "established" the SeventhDay Adventist Religion. Rather, governmental neutrality toward religion demanded
this decision, in reaffirmation of the principle set down in Everson v. Board of Educ.5
that no state may exclude believers or nonbelievers, "because of their faith, or lack of
it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation." 1
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a concurring
opinion, reasoned that no state interest,
however secular in purpose, could justify
governmental interference with an individual's religious scruples.7 This does not mean,
however, that an individual can demand
from the government financial support to
exercise his religious beliefs.
While concurring in the result, Mr. Justice Stewart attempted to prove that the
majority had contradicted itself and had not
succeeded in "papering over" the "doublebarreled dilemma" presented by the case.
To uphold the appellant's claim, he argued,
was to prefer a religious over a secular
ground for being unavailable for work, and
therefore to establish a religion, according
to the "mechanistic" establishment theory
proposed by the majority in previous cases.8

4 Ibid.
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His solution to the dilemma was to drop the
strict neutrality principle and adopt a more
flexible theory.
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White
dissented on the ground that a state should
not be compelled constitutionally to carve
out an exception, based on a claimant's religious convictions, to its general rule of eligibility.!, They saw, however, sufficient flexibility in the norm of religious neutrality to
permit a state legislature to accommodate
the unemployment compensation law to the
exercise of religious belief, if it should so
choose.
The holding of the Sherbert case - that a
state public welfare program must not exclude persons who are unable to meet
requirements to share in such benefits because of their religious beliefs, where no
compelling state interest justifies this exclusion-raises questions about the consistency
of the case with Braunfeld v. Brown.- ° The
majority opinion saw no such problem. It
found in Braunfeld a strong state interest in
providing a uniform day of rest for all
workers, attainable only by declaring Sunday a day of rest. This justified a state in
denying an exemption to Sabbatarians from
Sunday closing laws. No such interest was
found in Sherbert.11
Mr. Justice Stewart would overrule
Braunfeld as wrongly decided because of
the criminal statute operating in that case.
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White
considered that the majority, in spite of its
disclaimer, had necessarily overruled Braunfeld. In their view, not only were the state
interests in both cases equally important,
but the economic burden on the individual

5 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
6 Id. at 16.

1 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963)
(concurring opinion).
8 Id. at 415 (concurring opinion).

9Id. at 423 (dissenting opinion).
10 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
11Sherbert v. Verner, supra note 7, at 408-09.
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resulting from denial of the benefits was
lighter in Sherbert. In their balancing of the
interests, the scale tipped toward the state.
It is difficult to see how, in the future, the
unemployment commission and the South
Carolina courts can avoid an inquiry into
the sincerity of the religious beliefs of a
claimant seeking benefits but unwilling to
work one day a week because of his beliefs.
Mr. Justice Brennan's majority opinion expressly refused to pass judgment on this
issue, although he stated that the state would
have to demonstrate that no alternative
forms of regulation would combat spurious
claims without infringing first amendment
rights. The dissent believed that an exception to the rules of eligibility based on religious convictions would necessitate judicial
examination of those convictions. Perhaps
the problem is no different from that presented by exemptions based on religious
belief in earlier cases decided by the Court
when the "preferred freedoms" doctrine
12
was first promulgated.
Another important aspect of the Sherbert
decision is its bearing on the aid to education issue. The holding seems logically to
demand that in general programs of state
and federal aid to students there be no
exclusions of individuals because of their
religious beliefs. The usual way in which a
student expresses his religious beliefs in the
field of education is by attending a churchrelated school. Thus, no student can be
denied tuition grants or tax benefits because
12 See Regan, Freedom of the Mind and Justice
Brennan, 9 CATHOLIC LAW. 269, 285 (1963).

he attends an accredited church-related
school, provided no substantial state interest justifies his exclusion. Itis difficult to
imagine the nature of such an interest; if
anything, the dominant interest of the state
lies in the opposite direction, namely, that
of furthering the education of all citizens.
State programs of fringe benefits to students (e.g., textbooks, lunches, bus transportation), which exclude children attending church-related schools, do not appear to
be affected by the Sherbert rationale. Such
exclusion is usually based on a public-private school classification, which lacks religious overtones. But where the exclusion
applies only to children attending churchrelated schools, it might well be argued that
the classification is unconstitutional. It
should be noted, however, that it is an open
question whether the Sherbert rationale can
be extended to include direct aid to institutions as well as individuals.
The concept of religious neutrality
emerges from the Schempp and Sherbet
decisions as a two-edged sword. While
Schempp banned governmental support of
religious exercises in the public school, the
Sherbert holding reinforced the principle
that our "institutions by solemn constitutional injunction may not officially involve
religion in such a way as to ...discriminate
against, or oppress, a particular sect or religion."' 3
JOHN J. REGAN, C.M.*
l:School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 1, at 231 (concurring opinion).
"Dean, Colleges of Liberal Arts & Sciences, St.
John's University.

